

21 November 1978

I. 1978 in Intelligence

A. Execution of the E.O. And Other Organizational Matters

6. INTELLIGENCE AND WARNING

STAT ☐ As DCI, I have no more important function than Warning--of potential or imminent attack on the U.S. and its allies and interests, but also in the broader sense of warning to the President and the NSC of any events abroad that should seriously concern them.

STAT ☐ It had become apparent to me as to others--including the HPSCI Subcommittee on Evaluations, as expressed in an August 1978 report, "Warning: An Assessment of Intelligence Community Performance and Capability"--that we needed a stronger national structure for warning. After careful study of alternative approaches, in early October I created an NIO for Warning and asked a senior NFAC officer steeped in experience and understanding of warning, Dick Lehman, to take this post as my senior staff officer for all warning matters. He will establish new national warning procedures and will, on a continuing basis, ensure maximum substantive sensitivity to the warning content of existing intelligence. The history of warning shows that we are better at collecting and processing warning related data than consistently discerning out of it actual warning and communicating that effectively to key users.

STAT ☐ On the policy and management side, my new NIO/Warning chairs an interagency Working Group on Warning* and will serve as Executive Secretary

* Membership: Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; DIA/Vice Director for Production; CIA/NFAC, Chief Requirements and Evaluation Staff; State/INR, Chief, Political/ Military Affairs; NSA, Chief, "V" Group; Associate Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking

to an NFIB committee of the whole on warning convened as necessary under chairmanship of the DDCI. Substantively, working through and directing the other NIOs, he will have responsibility for deciding of what to warn and to whom, when to do it and how. He is assisted by a DoD officer. Among the NIO for Warning's present priorities are:

- formulation of recommendations on how I and the entire Intelligence Community can best discharge important related responsibilities in crisis management;

- overseeing the shakedown period of a new monthly cycle of NIO-Community consultations on warning, followed by NIOs' communications to me describing their feel for which situations or trends in their various areas of responsibility I should worry more (or less) about in the ensuing one to three months; I expect this monthly barometric sounding to be especially valuable in keeping me sensitized to potentially significant developments in regions or on subjects on which I am otherwise not especially focused.

- developing close working relationships and mutual support understandings with the senior intelligence officers of the DoD commands;

- procedurally, reviewing the mission and functions of the Strategic Warning Staff; reviewing the DSCID relating to the warning mission (1/5); reviving or modifying as appropriate the Alert Memorandum as a key mechanism for conveying warning to senior consumers;

- development and implementation of a strategy to respond to the National Intelligence Topic on warning (II.I.): "How much warning

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of attack can the U.S. expect? To what extent are Soviet active and passive measures likely to degrade warning?"

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☐ Working closely with the NIO on all collection aspects of I&W will be the newly appointed National Intelligence Tasking Officer (NITO) for I&W and Crisis Management. To facilitate close liaison with DoD collection related to these missions, his alone of the NITO staffs will be colocated with DIA's Collection Coordination Facility in the Pentagon, adjacent to the National Military Command and Intelligence Centers.

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☐ Warning Improvement Study and Plan (WISP) is a Community effort to provide more operational structure and focus to the total strategic Warning problem. This ongoing project has this year agreed on a set of target indicators for warning situations and developed a concept for the requirements, strategy and management stages of collection on warning. DIA is testing a prototype of a WISP model that would allow the warning analyst to enter indications data at any level of generalization and get out a "temperature" reading in relation to data base normal activity levels.

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☐ For the important and traditional European warning arena, NIE 4-1-78: "Warsaw Pact Concepts and Capabilities for Going to War in Europe; Implications for NATO Warning of War," provided customers with structured insight into Warsaw Pact attack options, and the nature, timeliness and implications of warning NATO might expect.

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☐ Possibly the most serious known Warning problem intelligence now faces is the potential for very rapid initiation of hostilities in Korea. In June DIA published "Warning in Korea" (WINK), the most rigorous

and structured analysis yet attempted on the probability of collecting and interpreting all warning indicators identified for the potential North Korea attack scenario perceived by Intelligence Community assessment as the most likely and dangerous. The Community and appropriate military commands participated in WINK.

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☐ On the procedures and mechanisms side of I&W, a recent comprehensive DIA review of the worldwide DoD I&W System revealed need for managerial as well other System upgrade. A new Policy Council of the System, chaired by DIA's Vice Director for Production and composed of the J2s of the eight Unified and Specified Commands and the four Service Intelligence Chiefs assists the Director, DIA in his capacity as Chairman of the DoD I&W System. The Policy Council meets semi-annually on an extensive DoD I&W managerial agenda aimed at improving DoD's timely strategic warning capability and ensuring that improvements made at DoD and field command level are complementary and not contradictory. The Council is assisted by a working level planning group.

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☐ DIA is also working in an experimental/operational mode an Advanced Indications Structure (AIS), a statistically oriented approach to monitoring a wide variety and high volume of indications activity via computer driven mathematical algorithms to determine normal levels and differentiate unexpected or unusual levels. Two subsystems are involved. The ELINT Analysis one has the objective of rapid conversion of large volumes of ELINT data into information readily understandable to analysts and presentable in a non-technical

format to top decisionmakers. The Intelligence Exploitation Subsystem, designed to winnow I&W related current intelligence out of the total output of sources other than ELINT, is currently being tested on the product of space based technical sensors.